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I. INTRODUCTION
W I-FI networks are prone to a number of attacks due to openness of the medium [1] , [2] . In this letter, we propose a new insider attack termed as "Advanced Stealth Manin-The-Middle" (ASMiTM) that combines Stealth Man-in-TheMiddle (SMiTM) [3] and Wireless Denial of Service (WDoS) [3] attacks. Both SMiTM and WDoS attacks exploit the Hole 196 vulnerability in the Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) encrypted Wi-Fi networks. As per the 802.11 standard [4] , only Access Points (APs) are allowed to use the group transient key for encryption of broadcast/multicast frames. However, malicious insiders can exploit the Hole 196 vulnerability and spoof as AP to inject broadcast/multicast frames encrypted with the group transient key.
In a SMiTM attack an attacker poisons the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache of a client to setup a Man-in-TheMiddle environment to intercept the client's traffic. However, SMiTM attack is usually short lived because a fresh ARP update replaces the poisoned ARP cache entries with genuine ones. Regular insertion of spoofed ARP frames is required to sustain the attack but such regularity may lead to SMiTM attack detection. Technique proposed in [5] can detect SMiTM attack using ARP probing.
To prevent replay attacks in the WPA2 encrypted Wi-Fi networks, each frame contains a packet number which is monotonically increasing. Frames having lesser packet number than its current packet number are dropped by the client assuming them to be replay frame(s). In a WDoS attack, the attacker inflates the broadcast packet number value of a client to a higher value. This results in legitimate broadcast/multicast frames sent with lower packet number values being dropped by the client assuming them to be replay frame(s). ASMiTM attack proposed in this paper prolongs the effects of the individual SMiTM and WDoS attacks while preserving stealthiness. Furthermore, the proposed attack causes dropping of broadcast/multicast frames leading to tougher detection as compared to the individual attacks. The probing technique suggested in [5] for detecting SMiTM attack fails to detect ASMiTM attack. ASMiTM attack enables a malicious insider to steal intellectual property, client's credentials etc. without involving any brute force or key cracking. As WPA2 is one of the most widely used encryption techniques for securing Wi-Fi networks, ASMiTM attack is a major challenge with virtually no easy quick fix.
II. HOLE 196, STEALTH MiTM, AND WDoS ATTACKS

A. Hole 196
The Hole 196 vulnerability exposes authorized client(s) of a WPA2 secured Wi-Fi network to malicious insiders. The WPA2 encryption involves two types of keys-Pairwise Transient Key and Group Transient Key. The pairwise transient key is a twoway key and is unique to every client that is associated with an AP. This key is used by both the AP and the client for encryption and decryption of unicast traffic that is exchanged (one-to-one) in between them. On the other hand the group transient key is a one-way key shared between all the clients that are associated with the AP. The group transient key is used by the AP for encryption while the clients use it for decryption of broadcast/multicast traffic.
Clients cannot not use the group transient key for encryption as per the 802.11 standard. However, by exploiting the Hole 196 vulnerability, a malicious client can spoof as AP and inject broadcast/multicast frames by encrypting them using the group transient key. But a malicious client cannot spoof as another genuine client and encrypt unicast frames to be sent to the AP using its own pairwise transient key. This is because a client's MAC address is used for the computation of its pairwise transient key. However, the group transient key can be spoofed as it is not bound to a client's MAC address. This loophole is known as the "Hole 196" vulnerability.
B. Stealth Man-in-The-Middle (SMiTM) Attack
SMiTM attack exploits the Hole 196 vulnerability to set up a Man-in-The-Middle environment by injecting spoofed ARP frames to poison the ARP cache of the client(s) in the network. By poisoning the ARP cache of a client, an attacker re-directs traffic coming from the client to a different target. In this attack, an attacker spoofs as the AP and injects falsified ARP frames encrypted with the group transient key. A small network setup demonstrating the SMiTM attack is shown in Fig. 1 . ATKR 1558-2558 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. is the attacker, VCTM is the victim client connected to the same AP and GTWY is the gateway. GRPKY denotes the group transient key, PVTKY VCT M and PVTKY AT KR represent pairwise transient key of VCTM and ATKR, respectively. The ATKR crafts a spoofed ARP request frame with source IP:MAC set to IP-GTWY:MAC-ATKR (i.e., spoofing gateway's IP address with the attacker's MAC address) and destination IP:MAC set to IP-VCTM:Broadcast. The ATKR encrypts the spoofed ARP frame with the GRPKY thereby spoofing as the AP. When the VCTM processes this frame, it updates its ARP cache with IP-GTWY:MAC-ATKR (poisoned) mapping. As the ATKR spoofs as the AP and encrypts the ARP frame using the GRPKY, the VCTM assumes that the frame came from the AP and updates its ARP cache. Due to the ARP cache poisoning of the VCTM, frames sent by the VCTM to the GTWY are intercepted by the ATKR. To escape detection, the ATKR forwards the frame to the GTWY. After receiving the corresponding response from the GTWY, the ATKR forwards the response back to the VCTM so that the ATKR's identity as Man-in-The-Middle is concealed.
C. Wireless Denial of Service (WDoS) Attack
The WPA2 encryption technique prevents replay attacks by using a replay counter known as packet number in every frame. Fig. 2 shows the frame format of cipher-block chaining message authentication code protocol encapsulation. The packet number is a 48-bit (6 octets shown in bold in Fig. 2 ) monotonically incrementing non-negative integer, initialized to 1 when the corresponding transient key is initialized. The client and its associated AP maintain a separate 48 bit replay counter for unicast and broadcast traffic. The packet number value at the AP and the client are always in sync. A client discards any frame that is receives with the broadcast packet number value less than or equal to its current packet number value.
We explain the WDoS attack using an example in Fig. 3 . The locally cached broadcast packet number (represented as PAC-NUM) value at the VCTM and the AP is 780. The ATKR spoofs as the AP and sends a broadcast/multicast frame encrypted with the GRPKY having high PACNUM value (i.e., 1500 in this example). In this frame the FromDS bit is set to 1 and the ToDS bit is set to 0 to make the frame appear to be coming from the AP. All clients (including the VCTM) update their broadcast PACNUM value to 1500. As the AP did not send this frame, it is unaware of the change in the broadcast PACNUM value of the VCTM. As a result, it sends the successive broadcast/multicast frames with old PACNUM values-781, 782 and so on. The VCTM drops all broadcast/multicast frames having PACNUM value less than 1500, resulting in a loss of frames.
III. PROPOSED ASMiTM ATTACK
The basic network setup used for illustrating the proposed ASMiTM attack is shown in Fig. 4 . Some details of the network like keys and the IP:MAC mapping of the ATKR, VCTM and GTWY are also shown. We now describe the stepwise procedure to launch ASMiTM attack and its impact.
Step 1: The ATKR needs to perform the following four tasks to launch ASMiTM attack: 1) ARP Poisoning: The ATKR crafts a spoofed ARP request frame with source IP address set to GTWY's IP address, source MAC address set to the ATKR's MAC address, destination IP address set to VCTM's IP address and destination MAC address set to broadcast MAC address.
2) Reset ToDS and set FromDS bit:
The ATKR resets the ToDS bit and sets the FromDS bit to make the ARP request frame appear to be coming from the AP. ToDS and FromDS bits are used to determine the direction in which the frame is traveling. The frame travels from a client (AP) to an AP (client) if the ToDS (FromDS) bit is set. 3) Set high PACNUM value: The ATKR sets a high PACNUM value in the ARP request frame to advance the VCTM's broadcast PACNUM value. In a SMiTM attack the PACNUM value is not modified. The increase in
PACNUM value ensures that the ARP cache of the VCTM does not get the genuine IP:MAC mapping, resulting in longer attack duration. 4) Transmit the ARP request frame:
The ATKR encrypts the ARP request frame with the GRPKY and transmits it. When the VCTM processes this spoofed ARP frame, its ARP cache is poisoned and its broadcast PACNUM value is advanced to the value received in the frame. Due to ARP poisoning, the VCTM's ARP cache has IP:MAC for the GTWY as IP-GTWY: MAC-ATKR. Now, for the VCTM, the ATKR is the gateway.
Step 2: To send data to the GTWY, the VCTM encrypts the frame using PVTKY VCT M and transmits it. AP decrypts the frame sent by the VCTM and finds that the frame needs to be forwarded to the ATKR.
Step 3: In Step 2, the VCTM intended to send the frame to the GTWY. However, due to ARP poisoning of the VCTM the frame is sent to the ATKR instead of the GTWY. To send data to the ATKR, the AP encrypts the received frame from the VCTM with PVTKY AT KR and forwards it. So the frame sent by the VCTM to the GTWY is intercepted by the ATKR before reaching the GTWY. Thus, the ATKR becomes the Man-in-The-Middle for the VCTM and the GTWY.
Step 4: To escape detection, the ATKR must behave like an intermediary. So it forwards the received frame from the VCTM to the GTWY by encrypting it using PVTKY AT KR .
Step 5: The AP forwards the response obtained from the GTWY back to the ATKR. If the ARP cache had not been poisoned in Step 1, this response would have come to the VCTM directly. To evade detection, the ATKR must forward this frame back to the VCTM.
Step 6: The ATKR encrypts the received frame in the previous step using PVTKY AT KR , sets the destination MAC address to VCTM's MAC addressand transmits the frame.
Step 7: The AP decrypts the received frame in the last step, encrypts it using PVTKY VCT M and forwards it to the VCTM. So, the VCTM is unaware about the presence of the ATKR behaving as Man-in-The-Middle.
The AP is unaware about the change in the PACNUM value of the VCTM. So any broadcast/multicast frame sent by the AP with an old PACNUM value is dropped by the VCTM.
The proposed ASMiTM attack is more potent than the individual SMiTM and WDoS attacks for the following reasons: 1) SMiTM attack is detectable by the method proposed in [5] , where ARP probes are used to verify the genuineness of IP:MAC mapping sent in ARP request frames. If a malicious client is present an ARP probe results in two responses (one from the genuine client and another from the malicious client) having mis-matched IP:MAC mapping. The mis-matched IP:MAC mapping indicates the presence of SMiTM attack. However, in an ASMiTM attack the attacker inflates the broadcast packet number value of the client. As a result, the ARP probe receives only one response (from the malicious client) as the real client drops the ARP probe assuming it to be a replay frame. 2) If a user's ARP cache is poisoned, a fresh ARP update replaces the poisoned entries with genuine entries. However, in an ASMiTM attack as the broadcast packet number value is inflated to a larger value, a fresh ARP update is dropped by the client assuming it to be a replay frame, thereby prolonging the attack duration. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To evaluate the effect of ASMiTM attack, a small network setup similar to the one shown in Fig. 4 is built. The attacker terminal is loaded with BackTrack 5R3, MadWifi drivers [6] and wpa_supplicant [7] . As discussed in the last section, in an ASMiTM attack the attacker needs to spoof as AP and use the group transient key for encryption. This is implemented by: (i) using wpa_supplicant to obtain the most recent group transient key used by the clients. (ii) slight modification of the MadWifi drivers so that the attacker can use the group transient key for encryption. (iii) converting a ToDS frame to a FromDS frame. This conversion can be done by a cyclic shift of the address fields of the MAC frame format, setting the ToDS flag to 0 and FromDS flag to 1, as shown in Fig. 5 . A wireless sniffer is also developed in C to capture the network traffic under promiscuous mode. Fig. 6 illustrates the traffic seen by the wireless sniffer in the network under normal and attack scenarios. The shaded stripes represent the time periods during which the attack frames are injected into the network. In an ASMiTM attack the attacker injects forged frames into the network thereby increasing the network traffic. However, it may be observed from Fig. 6 that traffic characteristics during normal and attack scenarios do not differ extensively. This is due to the fact that only few ARP frames need to be injected into the network to launch ASMiTM attack. If a statistical profile is constructed on the basis of traffic characteristics and used for anomaly based attack detection, it would lead to high false alarm rate. Table I shows the experimentally derived durations of SMiTM and ASMiTM attack on the basis of ARP refresh policy of different operating systems. As seen in row two of Table I , the effect of SMiTM attack on the XPSP3 machine lasts till the ARP cache is refreshed i.e., 2 minutes. However, on the BackTrack5R3 machine the effect of SMiTM attack is nullified even before the default ARP cache refresh time, due to arrival of a fresh ARP update at the 3.8 th minute. Windows 7 and Ubuntu 14.04 have persistent ARP caches. In such cases, SMiTM attack is nullified only by fresh ARP updates. So, SMiTM attack is invalidated only if genuine IP:MAC mapping are present in the ARP cache. This occurs under the following two conditions, whichever is earlier-(i) arrival of a fresh ARP update. (ii) ARP refresh-which erases all the ARP entries (including the spoofed ones). As ARP refresh clears all the ARP entries, the client needs to re-obtain the IP:MAC mapping of the target host with which it wishes to communicate. The client can obtain the (genuine) mapping using the standard ARP request/response sequence. However, ARP refresh cannot nullify the effect of ASMiTM attack. Even if ARP refresh clears the falsified IP:MAC mapping of a target, the genuine mapping cannot be obtained immediately because the inflated packet number update delays the processing of ARP frames coming from the target. So, the duration of ASMiTM attack can be made longer than SMiTM by choosing an appropriate inflated value of the packet number. The fourth column of the table shows the influence of ASMiTM attack based on the inflated value of the packet number. A comparison on impact of SMiTM, WDoS, and ASMiTM attacks on different network aspects is shown in Table II . Quite clearly, ASMiTM attack is powerful than SMiTM and WDoS attacks.
A. Challenges in the Detection of ASMiTM Attack
The 802.11 standard does not provide any mechanism to detect the source MAC forgery of the frames encrypted using the group transient key. This leaves the client with no option but to accept forged frames encrypted with the group transient key that has correct semantics, as seen in the case of ASMiTM attack. The sequence and semantics of the ARP operations under normal and ASMiTM attack are the same. As a result, detecting ASMiTM attack using signature based attack detection schemes would be difficult. As explained earlier, anomaly based schemes would lead to high false alarm rate. One possible solution is to upgrade the WPA2 protocol while maintaining backward compatibility to prevent misuse of the group transient 
